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NATO is dead – Long live NATO!
The various scenarios and forecasts for the future of
NATO come at a time when the alliance is undeni-
ably facing the most complex and ambitious set of
tasks in its history. At the same time the debates and
constraints within the alliance concerning a revised
strategic concept for the alliance or how to lead the
Afghanistan mission to an end are producing more
and more irritation. This irritation usually provokes a
look back into history to the supposed good old
days, when everything seemed to be so much easier
and more predictable. Especially since the transat-
lantic and intra-European dispute over the Iraq war
in 2003, commentators like to refer to the alleged
greater efficiency of NATO during the cold-war era.
Reality, of course, looks different, and it is especially
in the year of the 60th anniver-
sary that we all should become
aware again of how dramatical-
ly NATO has changed during
the last six decades in order to
understand that adaptation to
the strategic reality without let-
ting the basic principles out of
sight is the best way for surviv-
al. There never was only one version of the cold-war
NATO, and there never was a time without internal
constraints or disputes. The 1967 Harmel-Report,
which provided more flexibility than the previous
concept of massive disenchantment, was not a result
of pure harmony within the alliance, nor was the
NATO-Double-Track decision in the late 1980s
favoured by everybody. The latter came only into
being after severe discussion between European lea-
ders like German chancellor Helmut Schmidt and
US-President Jimmy Carter. The decision to start the
so-called out-of-area operations at the beginning of
the 1990s was just as heavily debated as the idea of
a more autonomous European Security and Defence
Identity (ESDI) within the alliance. Recalling the
dramatic changes in the geostrategic environment
since the late 1940s, it is clear that NATO never saw
easy times. In fact, that is why NATO even exists in
the first place, because if it had been easy times
there would have been no demand for an organisa-
tion like it.
The current debate concerning the strategic irrel-
evance of the alliance, the lack of political leadership
within NATO, and the gap between ambitions and
reality on the ground touches another important
issue. Despite the installation of a NATO secretary-
general, there does not exist this single person who
has to take the responsibility for action. It is the
members of NATO that make
up its assets, its capacities, its
capabilities, and its effects on
the international level. Without
the political will of these states
to commit themselves there
can’t be any future for NATO.
Without these states there
won’t be any solution to any
kind of problem the alliance is facing. NATO is
made up of 26 individual and sovereign states. This
means it is made up of 26 different armed services,
26 different state leaders, 26 different histories and
cultural characteristic, 26 different public opinions
and 26 different election-schedules and domestic
political agendas. And here comes the surprise:
Despite a lower number of member states, this multi-
faceted construction that makes consensus so diffi-
cult has been there since 1949 and even prior to that.
The Brussels Treaty of 1948, signed by France, the
UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg, was
directed against Germany and the Soviet Union. But
the five founding states would have answered 
“Without the political will of its mem-
ber states to commit themselves
there can’t be any future for NATO.
Without these states there won’t be
any solution to any kind of problem
the alliance is facing. ”
With the 60th Anniversary of the alliance at hand, its fate seems to be more uncertain and unpredictable than
ever. While some commentaries already foresee the end of NATO, there are others that rather portray a revitali-
zation of the old transatlantic alliance due to the new US-administration and the return of France into NATO’s
military command structures. But people tend to look too closely at NATO’s institutional and conceptual frame-
work and the future risks it is – at least theoretically – intended to counter. Instead, one should focus on the mem-
ber states and their relationship with other parties, because it is the capitols that define the framework for
NATO’s political and military action.
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differently if they had been asked which of the two
they feared the most. Alliances and organisations
such as NATO or the European Community for Coal
and Steel were not set up because the founding na-
tions were best friends, but because they shared a
set of common interests that were more important
than the economic, political, or cultural differences.
Over the years we forgot to see the differences be-
tween us, and we began to neglect that these differ-
ences influence us in our behaviour and our deci-
sions. Even worse, we think this variety of opinions
is a sign of weakness, that it is something 60 years of
partnership should have helped
to erase. But the truth is, it is
this heterogeneity that pro-
vides the ground for common
solutions, because without it
there wouldn’t be the necessity
to find the compromise, there
wouldn’t be the continuing ex-
change of ideas and views, and
there wouldn’t be the agree-
ment that some challenges
demand common commitment despite differences
in other areas of interest. The first chancellor of the
German Empire, Count Otto von Bismarck, based
his Realpolitik on this simple analysis: States don’t
have friends; states have interests. Europe as well as
the transatlantic partnership were, and still are,
communities of interests. That is why we decided to
join and to cooperate after the Second World War,
and this is why we still need to cooperate today. No
Mr. NATO will find a satisfying solution for Af-
ghanistan; it is the 26 sovereign states that have to
combine their efforts to form effective engagement.
Several briefing books and reports have been pub-
lished during the recent months, providing a broad
picture of the challenges and risks that demand fur-
ther international commitment. Proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, climate change, secu-
rity of energy supply, and a rising threat of piracy on
the major supply routes to Europe are but some of
them. Risks cause certain effects on our society,
economy, and sovereignty. What we need to define
are the counter-effects and the assets that drive the
capabilities we need for implementing the neces-
sary steps. But instead of looking at the specific
technical, political, financial, or military details of
the various issues, NATO should first concentrate on
the barriers that limit potential effects of measures
at hand. Changes cannot be forced through institu-
tional changes or the focus on NATO structures and
command posts, but are rather promoted through
dialogue between the relevant internal and external
partners. In this sense some of the more urgent
issues can be summarized and put under more
general tasks. Three of them seem to be the most
promising areas for future initiatives, and should
therefore get a prominent place on the agenda of the
upcoming NATO meeting in Kehl/Strasbourg:
Dialogue and cooperation with Russia, the issue of
NATO-enlargement, and the relationship between
the United States and the European Union.
1. Closer cooperation with
Russia: Missile Defence, prolif-
eration of weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery
systems, the Black Sea area
and NATO’s potential enlarge-
ment into that region, as well
as the dispute with Iran over
its nuclear program circle
around one major issue: The
strategic dialogue with Russia.
Some NATO members still refer to Moscow as a
potential enemy. But Russia is the most important
external partner NATO needs for promoting any
additional political steps. This is true for both the
positive approaches, like global proliferation trea-
ties, control regimes, and strategic arms reduction as
well as the negative measures such as sanctions or
blockades up to disarmaments operations. Undeni-
ably, Moscow follows a different economic approach
concerning its role in terms of energy security and
climate change. Therefore, the West needs to
respond to Moscow on a case-by-case basis and –
like Bobo Lo from the London-based CER calls it –
exercise strategic patience. The most important
actors on NATO’s side for a revitalization of NATO-
Russia cooperation are the United States and Ger-
many. While the former needs to redefine its stra-
tegic relationship with the once super-power and
leave the revived cold-war rhetoric of recent years
behind, the latter has to operate as the mediator
between those states that wish to cooperate more
closely with Moscow and those that still see a neces-
sity to defend themselves against Moscow.
2. Enlargement of NATO and the EU to the East and
Southeast: This issue is closely connected to Russia‘s
relationship to and influence on states within the
old area of Soviet influence. Any attempt in recent
years that brought NATO closer to the Russian bor-
der has led to diplomatic constraints and mistrust.
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“The first chancellor of the German
Empire, Count Otto von Bismarck,
based his Realpolitik on this simple
analysis: States don’t have friends;
states have interests. Europe as well
as the transatlantic partnership were,
and still are, communities of interests.”
The question whether Georgia and the Ukraine
should be offered the Membership Action Plan
(MAP) has provoked direct opposition from Mos-
cow. Consequently, there is a need for closer coopera-
tion that does not automatically lead to full mem-
bership like the MAP does. Especially concerning
the Black Sea region NATO should face reality and
stop its promotion of MAP to states in the area and
work more closely with Russia on defining a new
security architecture for the whole of Europe, from
the Atlantic to the Ural. This of course also touches
the issue of Turkey and its ambitions to become a
member of the European Union. The current dispute
concerning the possible nomination of Danish
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen as succes-
sor of Jaap de Hoop Schaeffer in his position as
NATO secretary-general underlines the interdepend-
ence of EU- and NATO-enlargement. Turkey is block-
ing any NATO-EU cooperation under the Berlin-
plus arrangements, and its dissatisfaction with the
accession-process to the European Union also cau-
ses damage to NATO. Providing Turkey with an op-
tion for closer cooperation with the EU below the
level of full membership could help end Ankara’s
blockade against NATO-EU cooperation, and create
a more credible and strategic partner for both NATO
and the EU in the Black Sea region. This could help
to establish the multilayered security architecture in
the area, integrating the United States through
NATO and closer US-Russian cooperation. More
flexibility on the issue of enlargement and accession
to NATO could also prove to be important for those
European countries that are not member of NATO,
e.g. Austria. These states now face a strategic dilemma
after France’s returning to NATO’s military com-
mand structure, because an ESDP approach towards
security and defence in and for
Europe alone is – if it ever was –
no longer realistic. The need for
multilateral cooperation has
become eminent. A solution to
closer cooperation without inte-
gration into NATO could help
them to step ahead.
3. US-EU co-operation: The two prior issues cannot
be solved without a redefinition of the relationship
between the two tiers of NATO, the United States
and Europe. Especially the co-operation between the
US and the European Union needs to be put on a
higher level. As long as the EU-US relations are do-
minated by economic and trade issues the strategic
relevance of their security cooperation for NATO will
be undermined by the discussions about burden-
sharing. But it is those never-ending discussions
about political hierarchy, the role of civil and military
means for stability, and the apparent dominance of
either side’s approach to security over the other’s
that block any progress for closer US-European co-
operation. This is not only a problem for NATO but
also for the United Nations and the work within the
Security Council. Therefore, the annual EU-US sum-
mits should be enhanced to a broader strategic dia-
logue forum, intended to identify common interests
and to support common risk awareness, paving the
way for more effective NATO and EU cooperation.
As unspectacular as these proposals may sound, as
important are they for understanding and solving
the true nature of the current NATO crisis: A lack of
political dialogue driven by pragmatism and the
need for effectiveness instead of ideological debates
from the past or wishful thinking approaches direc-
ted at NATO becoming a full-spectrum, all-in-one
player. NATO’s future role cannot be found in the
technical discussion about climate change but in the
debates about how to approach the relevant actors,
how to integrate them into multilateral and multi-
faceted initiatives, and how to sustain against both
over-excited expectations and ill-tempered dooms-
day scenarios.
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